"Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan: A Political Biography of Ozawa Ichiro" (Takashi Oka)

I was excited to read this book, as it was one of the few English-language biographies available at Lauinger Library on the infamous DPJ politician Ozawa Ichiro.  Before I delve into the details, I should note one thing for other interested readers.  This biography was originally written as a graduate thesis, and certainly reads as such.  Many chapters are spent proving a specific hypothesis, namely, that politician Ozawa Ichiro fit the model of a so-called “policy entrepreneur,” apparently a theoretical term for politicians who are motivated by divergent policy beliefs.  As such, unless one is immediately concerned with the ramifications of the author’s hypothesis, expect to delve through some technical details to get into the meat of the story. 

Oka starts with Ozawa's childhood.  Ozawa's father was an independent, reformist war-era Diet member, and several of Ozawa’s own beliefs trace back to him, especially his support for the U.S. security alliance and single-member constituencies, which will be discussed later.  Ozawa inherited his old man's koenkai (the highly personalized support organization used by Japanese politicians) after the late politician's death, though he chose not to use it to full effect, instead relying on the youth vote in a tough election.  Having emerged victorious, Ozawa entered the Diet in 1969, and joined the infamous Tanaka faction, a politician whom he would dutifully serve up until the mid-to-late 1980's.

Ozawa served as a Parliamentary Vice-Minister of several ministries in the Diet, but did not get his first big break until 1982, when he was made the head of the LDP party's electioneering bureau ("General Affairs Bureau," or "somukyokucho").  Here, he proved himself to be a master election strategist, ensuring that the LDP retained a majority after the grueling 1982 general election.  In 1989, Ozawa was appointed Secretary General of the LDP, and would later conduct a number of trade agreements with the U.S. under the Premiership of PM Takeshita Noboru, a distant successor of the Tanaka faction, even if not necessarily well-liked by Tanaka himself.  

Here's where we get into the most important part.  Beginning in the early 1990's, Ozawa began to push for electoral and political reform, an issue that he had first mentioned in 1969, when he promoted the idea of single-member electoral districts in Japan (keep in mind, since 1947, Japan had been using the Single-Non-Transferable-Vote system, which was heavily rigged through various means to keep the LDP in power.)  According to the author, who worked with and interviewed Ozawa extensively, Ozawa was convinced of the benefits of a single-member district system because of its first-past-the-post plurality voting method.  In such a system, one candidate is elected from one district, and whoever gets 51% of the vote wins.  This naturally incentivizes voters to coalesce into two main parties with a viable chance of breaking the 51% mark, a phenomenon known as Duverger's law.

This is not so in SNTV systems, where multiple positions exist for each district and the top three or four vote-getters are elected.  As such, SNTV elections make it easier for a politician with low levels of grassroots support (i.e, a politician from a small party or an unpopular one from a larger party) to win a seat, should they be able to rally enough voters to make it over the threshold.  If there are four possible positions in a district, for example, a candidate might need to only get 21% of the vote to secure one of the seats, rather than 51%.  Moreover, an SNTV system can be manipulated through strategic voting.  For example, an LDP lawmaker who is assured of victory could have some of his 'overflow' supporters vote for a fellow LDP candidate, pushing his comrade over the, say, 21% threshold, and allowing the LDP to garner more of the district’s seats.  It should be noted that the LDP's dominance of the SNTV system was aided by malapportionment, in which pro-LDP rural districts were given more MP's than their more liberal, urban counterparts.

Ozawa disdained the effects of the SNTV system, seeing it as a manipulable, corruption-prone device.  On the other hand, he saw the politics of those countries which used single-member districts - Britain was his chief model - as far superior.  He admired the concept of alternation in power, feeling that it offered fresh policy options and kept corruption in check.  In Japan, he felt that a plurality system would provide the public with meaningful electoral choices, and bring an end to the LDP's nearly 38-year lock-hold on power.

In 1990, Ozawa convinced P.M. Kaifu Toshiki to take the issue of electoral reform seriously (Author's note:   This probably only worked because Kaifu was one of the few LDP leaders to not be completely smeared by corruption at the time - he was selected as P.M. for this exact reason, after the disastrous "Recruit Scandal" broke in the late 80's.)  In response, Kaifu adopted a plan entailing a mixed PR/Single-member-district system, which had been suggested a number of times since the 1960's by government-created committees on electoral reform.  Such committees were typically organized by the LDP as 'cover' after a scandal, and after they issued their recommendations, were promptly ignored.  

Unfortunately, however, the First Gulf War occurred around the same time, and threw Japan into a crisis.  As the U.S. pressured it to join the anti-Saddam coalition, momentum was lost and the Kaifu administration failed to pass the reforms.  Ozawa would later break away from the LDP in 1993 with a large number of MP's from the Takeshita faction.  Along with a number of other reform parties created during this period, Ozawa and his "Shinseito" ("Renewal") party brought the LDP to a crushing defeat in the 1993 elections.  This was a historic moment, as it marked the first time since 1947 that the LDP had actually lost its governing majority.

Although the new coalition would only last 10 months, under the charismatic leadership of Hosokawa Morihiro, who was chosen by Ozawa, it nonetheless succeeded in bargaining with the minority LDP to produce an electoral reform bill.  This legislation brought about the long-awaited PR/Single-district system.  Success at last!  But not quite.  Hosokawa unexpectedly resigned in 1994 after an intra-party snafu over a potential consumption tax increase, and the LDP united with the Socialists to win the next elections.  The LDP would, in the coming years, actually enjoy a resurgence under the charismatic leadership of Hashimoto Ryutaro, and perhaps most importantly, Junichiro Koizumi.  During a brief period of time,  however, from 1998-2000, Ozawa did manage to join the LDP in a coalition government and force the P.M., Obuchi Keizo, to carry out some pretty serious reforms (perhaps most importantly, bureaucrats were banned from the floor of the Diet chambers.)  

In 2009, however, the single-member district system began to mature, and a convincing opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan – formed by Ozawa and future PM Kan Naoto – took power.  Currently, Japan is still ruled by the DPJ, which has experienced a questionable record of success.  Regardless, however, the author feels that the DPJ is bound to stay, because of Duverger’s law.  According to Oka, the DPJ and its predecessors’ gradual gains ever since 1993 are a sign that the effects of the single-district system are, in fact, taking hold in Japan.  Given how many argue that Japan’s cultural traditions make it impossible for a genuine two-party system to take root, this is a controversial point. 

Oka also spent a considerable portion of the book detailing Ozawa’s foreign policy stances.  Once regarded as a member of Japan’s “new right,” Ozawa believes that Japanese Self-Defense Force members ought to be able to enter combat, as long as they fight under the aegis of the United Nations.  In Ozawa’s thinking, U.N. missions are a form of ‘collective defense,’ and by participating in such operations – no matter the role – Japanese soldiers are not necessarily fighting an offensive war on Japan’s behalf, which is outlawed by Article 9 of the Constitution.  Instead, they are merely fighting on the world’s behalf.  Ozawa sees such a step as absolutely necessary, should Japan ever wish to become a ‘normal’ nation and face its international duty squarely.  However, his opinions on this matter are controversial, and disavowed by many.


Alongside foreign policy and electoral reform, Ozawa's stances on other issues are also explained in great detail.  Like many members of the DPJ, Ozawa believes in a more liberal, non-interventionist economic policy, and at least in the book, feels that Japan ought to open its domestic market to more competition with foreign companies.  In a way that is uncommon among Japanese politicians, he also feels that the country ought to place more emphasis on the individual, rather than the group, should it hope to become a 'normal' nation with 'normal' politics.

Throughout the book, I often sensed that the author may have ‘played up’ Ozawa’s virtue or foresight at times, and obscured some of his true policy positions.  Given the author’s relatively close connection to Ozawa - Oka himself was an adviser to the politician - this is not necessarily surprising.  For example, Oka does not consider opposing points of view when it came to a real estate scandal concerning Ozawa.  He simply argues that Ozawa is innocent.  Moreover, I was also skeptical of several explanations offered by Oka about Ozawa's policies.  For example, while Oka argues that Ozawa believes firmly in Japan’s alliance with the U.S., I am aware of several other sources that suggest the opposite, almost painting Ozawa as an advocate of a Japan-China alliance.  Moreover, while Oka suggests that Ozawa is pro-trade and pro-liberalization, Ozawa is an opponent of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement, suggesting another area where Ozawa's stance in the book has either changed or is presented incorrectly.  Only more research and reading will be able to sort these dilemmas out, and I look forward to reporting back to you on them.  

Ultimately, I learned a lot from the book, though I still feel that there is much more to examine about Ozawa's stances on various issues.  I recommend this book, then, not necessarily for its content on Ozawa, but more because of its portrayal of various efforts at electoral reform after the 1980’s.  I have found that it is difficult to find accounts of these events with similar levels of quality, and as such, this book is a valuable source.